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Abstract
In this paper we study concentration in the European Internet upstream access market.
The possibility of measuring market concentration depends on a correct definition of
the market itself; however, this is not always possible, since, as it is the case of the
Internet industry, very often Antitrust authorities lack reliable pricing and traffic data.
This difficulty motivates our paper. We present an alternative approach based on the
inference of the Internet Operators interconnection policies using micro-data sourced
from their Border Gateway Protocol tables.
We assess market concentration following a two step process: firstly we propose a
price-independent algorithm for defining both the vertical and geographical relevant
market boundaries, then we calculate market concentration indexes using two novel
metrics. These assess, for each undertaking, both its   role in terms of essential network
facility and of wholesale market dominance. The results, applied to four leading
Internet Exchange Points in London, Amsterdam, Frankfurt and Milan, show that some
vertical segments of these markets are highly concentrated, while others are extremely
competitive. According to the Merger Guidelines some of the estimated market
concentration values would immediately fall within the special attention category.
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21.  Introduction
Market power is usually associated to the ability of a firm to raise prices above marginal
costs, or above their competitive level, without loss of profits. Competition authorities are
interested in market power because of its potential effects in reducing welfare, at least from a
static point of view1.
In this paper we attempt to measure the extent of market power characterising the
Internet upstream access in Europe. The structure of the Internet is indeed highly hierarchical,
with a relatively small number of upstream providers (the Internet backbones -IBPs-) that
face the interconnection demand arising from a much larger number of downstream operators
of smaller dimensions (Internet Service Providers -ISPs-). Our attempt is also related to the
ongoing debate on the possibility of introducing some form of regulation in the Internet
upstream access market, whose mechanisms are blamed by many countries to be the cause of
the persistence of the digital divide2.
It is clear that the possibility of correctly measuring market power depends on a
correct definition of the market itself; however, this is not always possible, since very often
the antitrust authorities lack reliable data. This is indeed what seems to happen for the
proposed mergers between Internet backbones. After the early antitrust cases (1998, MCI and
WorldCom merger; 2000, MCI-WorldCom and Sprint), new guidelines were introduced in
July 2002. Their applicability is however still very problematic for the assessment of the
Internet upstream connectivity market, where both interconnection agreements and traffic
flows are sealed under confidentiality agreements.
This difficulty motivates our paper. We present an alternative approach to define the
relevant market and assess market concentration in the upstream Internet access by using
publicly available data. In particular, our analysis is based on the inference of interconnection
policies, expressing the real bargaining power of each ISP: these can be essentially grouped
into (1) paid transit, a contractual relation characterised by non linear pricing, a typical
discrimination practice and  (2) peering, a bilateral free interconnection decision based on a
reciprocal agreement, again an open form of discrimination formally expressed in the peering
policy of every provider. The inference is obtained from the Border Gateway Protocol (BGP)
output data (the BGP is a set of “instructions” that rules the transmission of traffic packets
over the Internet).   We use two different metrics as proxies for each ISP’s traffic flows: one
                                               
1 However its impact on the dynamic and productive efficiency is controversial, because of the role of market
power as an incentive to innovate.
3of these measures infers the number of the ISP’s downstream customers, and the other its
centrality or “degree of unavoidability”.
We assess market concentration in the European upstream Internet market following a
two step process: firstly we determine the relevant market applying the vertical and
geographical relevant market definition algorithms and criteria; then we calculate market
concentration indexes, for the Internet Upstream Routing taking place in Europe, via four
leading Internet Exchange Points (IXPs)3: the London Internet Exchange Point (LINX), The
Deutsche Commercial Internet Exchange Point (DECIX), the Amsterdam Internet Exchange
Point (AMSIX) and the Milan Internet Exchange Point (MIX).
Interestingly, our measures prove to be very close to the one calculated with actual traffic
data4, indicating a potential application of this approach to the antitrust and regulation
authorities guidelines. The results show that some vertical segments of these markets are
highly concentrated, while others are extremely competitive. According to the Merger
Guidelines [U.S. Department of Justice (1997)], some of the estimated market concentration
values would immediately fall within the special attention category.
The rest of the paper is organised as follow: section 2 describes some of the early
antitrust inquires for the Internet backbone in the EU and the US. Section 3 discusses the new
Regulatory framework  for the market of electronic communication issued in 2002 by the
Commission and section 4 revises some early related studies. Section 5 describes more recent
studies on which we base our classification algorithms while  section 6 provides the actual
classification, discusses how to use these algorithms to evaluate market concentration across
the European IXPs, and suggests how to define the relevant vertical market boundaries.
Section 7 applies  the vertical and geographical relevant market definition to calculate market
concentration in various European Internet upstream markets. Finally section 8 concludes the
paper.
                                                                                                                                                 
2
 For a review of this debate see Giovannetti and Ristuccia (2005).
3
 IXPs are independent organizations composed by Internet Service Providers, where they can route their traffic
in a cost effective and technically efficient way.
4
 These data were obtained for research purposes from the London Internet Exchange Point under confidentiality
and a non disclosure agreement.
4 2.   Early Antitrust analysis for the backbone market
The Internet backbone market witnessed an extremely rapid transformation in the last ten
years, also because of  a  large wave of  mergers and acquisitions.  This process led to
growing concerns relating  to possible   abuse of market power, one expression of which has
been identified in the different interconnection charges levied to small and larger providers, a
process started in 1997 by UUNET’s decision of setting minimum traffic requirements for
free peering with smaller ISP's.
An early analysis was provided by  Cave (1999) who  analyzed the possible problems and/or
desirability of having some degree of market power and a hierarchical structure in the
Internet backbone.
 The two most relevant antitrust cases discussed in the industry have been  the merger
between MCI and WorldCom in 1998 and the rejected proposed merger between MCI-
WorldCom and Sprint in 2000. In both cases the identification of the relevant market posed
difficult but interesting questions due to the lack of reliable data.
During the 1998 MCI WorldCom merger analysis the European Commission5 included in
the backbone market all the providers which were able to obtain global connectivity either
through private or public peering, needing no transit contracts. This definition was
subsequently modified: only the providers reaching global connectivity exclusively via
private peering were included in the backbone market (see Buccirossi et al., 2005).
The three relevant markets affected by the proposed merger were identified as being:
1) the provision of host to point of presence connectivity, 2) the provision of Internet access
services and 3) the provision of top-level or universal connectivity. The investigation,
concentrated in this last product market. One of the main issues at stake, and a major source
of disagreement between the Commission and the two defendant companies, concerned the
hierarchical nature of the Internet. The Commission stressed that a hierarchical structure was
clearly exposed by the evidence that top level providers achieve their connectivity entirely by
settlement-free peering mainly at private peering points, whereas smaller providers need to
purchase transit from top-tier networks to achieve global connectivity6. The Commission
                                               
5
 On the 11th of January 2000, the European Commission received a notification by which MCI-WorldCom
would merge with Sprint by an exchange of shares. After an extensive investigation into the merger proposal on
the 28th of June 2000 the Commission  adopted the decision that “ The notified concentration consisting of the
merger between MCI-WorldCom and Sprint  is declared incompatible with the common market and the
functioning of the EEA Agreement.” [Official Journal of the European Commission (2000)]
6
 The dominant position of WorldCom had been attained through a very active acquisition policy. In the Civil
Action brought by Department of Justice of the United States [U.S. Department of Justice (DoJ) 2000a]  against
the acquisition of Intermedia Communications by  WorldCom are described  some of the more than 60
5defined the relevant market as the one composed by the providers  equipped with a set of
peering agreements with 100% settlements free connectivity across the Internet and found
that only five top-level networks, MCI WorldCom, Sprint, AT&T, Cable & Wireless and
GTE,  satisfied these criteria. Consequently the antitrust authorities defined the market
participants as those who peer both with MCI and Sprint and by adding networks accessible
directly rather than through a third party, a total of seventeen players were considered for the
analysis of the market for top level Internet connectivity. Any other Internet provider, left
outside this market definition, would require to purchase transit from at least one of the top
five providers to achieve global connectivity.
The proposed new  merged entity would have had a market share between [37-51]%
in terms of traffic flows, against  the next competitor’s one not larger than 15%. The
Commission concluded that the proposed merger would have led to the emergence of a top
level network provider, able to act almost independently of its competitors and customers and
to determine its own, and its competitors, prices and the technical developments in the
industry. Another relevant issue, decisive in appraising the competitive effects of the merger,
was its effects on potential entry in the industry. Since the peering rules require an entrant to
be of considerable size, the Commission found that the merger would have generated a
formidable barrier for potential entrants in the top tier backbone market.
Following these considerations, in July 2000, the proposed merger between MCI-
WorldCom and Sprint has been abandoned after the block imposed not only in the EU but
also by the U.S. Department of Justice (DoJ). The Federal Trade Commission considers
Market concentration as the fundamental  parameter when assessing the competitive impact
of a proposed merger.  Indeed, following the U.S. Horizontal Merger Guidelines , “A merger
is unlikely to create or enhance market power or to facilitate its exercise unless it
significantly increases concentration and results in a concentrated market, properly defined
and measured. Mergers that either do not significantly increase concentration or do not result
in a concentrated market ordinarily require no further analysis.”7 The results of the DoJ
                                                                                                                                                 
acquisitions operated by this company: in 1995 WorldCom acquired the network service operations of Williams
Telecommunications in 1996, through the acquisition of MFS Communications Company, WorldCom  obtained
the control of UUNET, the world largest Internet backbone provider. In 1998 WorldCom acquired Compuserve
a leading Internet provider and ANS,  AOL’s primary Internet backbones network.  Other acquired backbones
were GridNet, Unicom-Pipex, InNet, NL Net and Metrix Interlink. As a result of the leadership position reached
in these years  the WorldCom acquisition of MCI in September 1998 has been accompanied by the imposition,
by the US DoJ and the EU Commission, for MCI to divest its Internet assets to Cable & Wireless.
7
 In detail, the FTC  uses the Hirschman-Herfindahl Index ("HHI") of market concentration. The HHI is
calculated by summing the squares  of the individual market shares of all the participants and multiplied by ten
6merger analysis found that “the proposed merger of WorldCom and Sprint will cause
significant harm to competition in many of the nation’s most important telecommunications
markets. By combining two of the largest telecommunications firms in these markets, the
proposed acquisition would substantially lessen competition in violation of Section 7 of the
Clayton Act... For millions of residential and business consumers throughout the nation, the
merger will lead to higher prices, lower service quality, and less innovation than would be the
case absent its consummation. The United States therefore seeks an order permanently
enjoining the merger.” This motivation was based on the role of backbone market
concentration as expressed by the HHI, calculated on the traffic shares,  which was, before
the merger,  approximately 1850; and it would have risen, because of the merger, by
approximately 1150 points to circa 3000. [U.S. Department of Justice (DoJ) 2000b] 8.
3.   New Regulatory Framework and the Commission’s guidelines
The regulatory interest in the backbone market remained high and, after a public consultation
on the Review of the Electronic Communications Sector, the Commission proposed in July
2000 a package of measures introducing a new regulatory framework for electronic
communication networks and services. This was intended to provide a lighter regulatory
touch where markets have become more competitive while supporting sustainable and
affordable prices and protecting basic consumers rights9. The application of the Regulatory
framework was then essentially described, also in its relevant operational aspects,  in  the
“Guidelines on market analysis and assessment of significant market  power under the
Community regulatory framework for electronic communications networks and services”
published on the 11th of July 2002.
The Commission’s guidelines focus only on issues related to (i) market definition; and
(ii) the assessment of significant market power (SMP) within the meaning of Article 14 of the
                                                                                                                                                 
thousands.  The guidelines focus on two figures: pre-merger HHI concentration index level, and post-merger
HHI concentration increments. When the post-merger HHI is below 1000, the guidelines consider the market as
being non concentrated, and no further analysis is required. When the post-merger HHI ranges between 1000
and 1800 the guidelines consider these markets as moderately concentrated. In this case further scrutiny is
required only if the merger would increase the HHI of more than 100 points. Finally, when post-merger HHI is
above 1800 the markets are considered highly concentrated. In this case an increase in the HHI of more than 50
points will start raising concerns, while an increase of more than 100 points is considered as potentially
dangerous for the increase of market power it will entail.
8
 http://www.usdoj.gov/atr/cases/f5000/5051.pdf
9
 The final test was published on the 4th of February 2002,  (See Official Journal 2002
(http://europa.eu.int/information_society/topics/telecoms/regulatory/new_rf/documents/03672en1.pdf ).
7framework Directive, that individuated SMP when a firm “enjoys a position of economic
strength affording it the power to behave to an appreciable extent independently of its
competitors, customers and ultimately consumers”.
Market Definition: Assessing Vertical Market Boundaries
The concept of relevant market is a key issue for antitrust analysis, since it is central to the
assessment of market power.  Indeed, article 81 in the Treaty of Rome, states that the
limitation of competition is to be assessed on the relevant market; while the article 82 defines
market dominance in relation to market shares, and the merger control is based on the
dominant position in relation to market shares.
Among different market definitions, two have received most attention from the
literature. One approach focussed on the “economic markets”, market for goods resembling
each other where the law of one price was supposed to operate. However Werden and Froeb
(1994) and Scheffman and Spiller (1987) argued that this concept of economic market was
inadequate to antitrust analysis. The aim of the second approach was to define the relevant
market as instrumental to its applications in the antitrust analysis. The leading definition of
relevant market, adopted by the European Commission, hence, is based on the characteristics
of substitutability among products, expressed by the cross-price elasticities: the relevant
market is the set of products and geographic regions which in some way constrain the pricing
behaviour of the firms providing the product under scrutiny; this means that the relevant
market is the set of commodities which are, in respect to consumers’ preferences, good
substitutes of each other, so that a price change in one of them will provoke a demand change
in the other.
Whenever assessing whether or not a given set of products or services in a given
geographical area constitutes a relevant market, for competition policy purposes, one has
therefore to assess the existence, and strength, of competitive constraints on the price-setting
behaviour of the producers of this set of commodities. A relevant market is  then composed
by the set including all of the commodities for which, if taken as a whole, the excluded ones
do not have competitive effects on them. These competitive constraints can either arise from
the demand-side of the market through demand substitution of the commodities under
analysis or from the supply-side substitution, either through existing or potential
8competitors10. Supply-side substitutability indicates whether suppliers other than those
offering the commodity in question start offering the relevant commodities, themselves, or
whether they react to the initial price increase by changing the price of their related
commodities.
The usual, empirical way of assessing demand and supply-side substitution is to apply
the so-called ‘hypothetical monopolist test’. This test asks what would happen if there were a
small but significant, lasting increase in the price of a given product or service, assuming that
the prices of all other products or services remain constant. This test is also known as
‘SSNIP’ (small but significant non transitory increase in price) and its importance lies
primarily in its use as a conceptual tool for assessing evidence of competition, based on
substitutability, between different products or services.
The nature of the SSNIP test is recursive.  It starts by considering  an initial set of
products that are thought to define the market and simulate an increase in their price; in
practice, the Commission’s guidelines suggest that the National Regulatory Authorities
should normally consider reactions to a permanent price increase of between 5 and 10%.
Suppose that the  price increase is unprofitable, since consumers are substituting other
products for the one the price of which increased: in this case  the test has to be re-carried,
with reference to the set of commodities composed by the initial one and by all those other
commodities which the test found as relevant substitutes in its previous rounds.
The  SSNIP test should be repeated considering an increasing set of products up to the point
where a relative price increase within the geographic and product markets defined will not
lead consumers to switch to readily available substitutes or to suppliers located in other areas
The SSNIP approach has however some limitation. In particular, one of the identified
problems is that the test outcome depends on the initial price level considered. Indeed, apart
from the special case of a constant price elasticity demand function, the size of the demand
reaction to a price increase will necessarily depend on the existing price level. If this starting
price level is already at the Monopoly level, (the optimal price in terms of profit
maximization), then any further price increase will lead to a profit loss.  In these
circumstances, where a firm has already exercised market power, a situation known as the
‘cellophane fallacy’, the SSNIP test would lead to a larger market extension than in the case
were initial prices were set at a competitive level.
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 Clearly potential competitors substitution will take a longer time interval than the existing competitors’ one.
9One further problem in applying the SSNIP test arises when there are forms of
discrimination, which generates   separate markets for the same commodity, depending on the
customer’s characteristics. Discrimination is however an essential feature characterising
Internet Interdomain routing, our object of study. Indeed, as we argued before,
interconnection agreements usually take the form of transit or peering. While transit is a
contractual relation rife with discrimination practices, starting from its typical non-linear
pricing structure,  peering is  a bilateral interconnection decision based  exclusively  on
discrimination and formally expressed in the peering policy of every provider.
Finally another major limitation lies in the data unavailability to perform the SSNIP Test.
Again, this is particularly true in the Upstream Internet routing, and further motivates us in
the construction of price-independent market structure indicators.
Supplying Universal Connectivity
Final users express a demand for Internet Connectivity, and ISPs’s role is to supply it. This
implies generating both incoming traffic, by demanding contents stored at a given off-net
location, and outgoing traffic exporting contents stored in its own routes.  To supply this
service ISPs will need to be able to cover the total set of IP addresses.  Universal connectivity
is indeed the ISPs’ production output. The inputs required to produce this output will be
three: 1) ISP’s own routes, and Off-net routes accessed:  2) through peering agreements and
3) though transit agreements via an upstream  provider. In this setting the problem of market
definition should be assessed in terms  on demand elasticities for input factor, i.e, the
traditional role played by consumer’s  preferences and their cross-elasticities of substitution is
now played by ISPs and their input demand functions cross-elasticities.
In this setting, a change in relative input prices, for example a reduction in transit
prices,  will modify the initial  input demand to a different ratio between transit and
peering11. However, this traditional microeconomic approach is now inapplicable since the
technological decision is constrained by the number, and identity, of willingly peering
partners.  This implies that, while a Small but Significant Non- transitory Increase in Price
for transit might induce an ISP to substitute some of its existing Transit routes with new
Peering ones, it might well be that this switch will be constrained by the unwillingness of the
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 In Economics, it is usually assumed that the exact combination of inputs, in our case peering and transit
agreements, is derived by a cost minimizing choice conditional to a given level of output. This depends, of
course, upon the functional form of the production function describing the technology, which uses these inputs
(transit and peering agreements) to produce the ISP output: Universal connectivity.
10
other ISPs to peer with it. These difficulties led us to introduce a market segmentation
algorithm (developed in Section 5),  based on a classification of ISPs which reflects the
existence of bilateral peering  refusals.
Market Definition: Assessing Geographic market Boundaries
Traditionally, the process of defining the boundaries of the geographic market proceeds along
the same lines as those discussed above in relation to the assessment of the demand and
supply-side substitution in response to a relative price increase. In the electronic
communications sector, the European Commission guidelines indicate two main criteria  to
determine the geographical scope of the relevant market: (a) the area covered by a network;
(b) the existence of legal and other regulatory instruments. On the basis of these criteria,
geographic markets can be considered to be local, regional, national or covering territories of
two or more countries. For the specific market of Internet upstream access in particular,
linguistic differences should play a minor role in segmenting the geography of
Interconnection. The European Commission guidelines also state that the relevant geographic
market comprises an area in which the undertakings concerned are involved in the supply and
demand of the relevant products or services, and the conditions of competition are similar or
sufficiently homogeneous; moreover the area must be distinguished from neighbouring areas
in which the prevailing conditions of competition are appreciably different.
Once again, the application of these criteria to the Internet upstream market seems at
least problematic. Hence, in this paper we follow a different approach to define the
geographical borders of the Internet Upstream Market. We first start by looking at the
features characterising the European IXPs in terms of the distribution of their members
within the different hierarchies of the Internet. Universal connectivity in the Internet is
achieved through the interconnection between all the hierarchies in the Internet, from the very
bottom (end users and Internet Access Providers, or IAP) to the very top (Tier-1 providers),
through the middle hierarchies. An ISP in the middle of the Internet hierarchy needs to be
connected to at least one Tier-1 to provide universal connectivity. Hence, two different IXPs
will not be considered as geographically separated markets if one IXP is characterized, for
example, by the presence of Tier 1 providers while the other IXP does not have Tier 1 among
its members. Indeed, in this case the two IXPs could complement each other, and therefore
the market is not geographically separated. In particular, we will consider as independent
locations the area having an IXP, that can provide Universal connectivity through the
11
presence of at least one Tier–1 Member. In conclusion, contrary to the guidelines
suggestions, similarity in competition implies duplication of access modalities at different
locations, indicating therefore geographically separated markets, while structural  differences
amongst IXPs will indicate, through access  complementarities, a single geographical market.
Significant Market Power
Once the market definition problem has been addressed, the next step is to assess the
existence of significant market power. According to Article 14 of the framework Directive12,
an ISP is “deemed to have significant market power if, either individually or jointly with
others, it enjoys a position equivalent to dominance, that is to say a position of economic
strength affording it the power to behave to an appreciable extent independently of
competitors customers and ultimately consumers.”
Often, the lack of evidence or of records of past behaviour or conduct will mean that
the market analysis will have to be based mainly on a prospective assessment. In these cases,
a dominant position is found by reference to a number of criteria and its assessment is usually
based on existing market conditions; in particular, market shares are often used as a proxy for
market power. Although a high market share alone is not sufficient to establish the possession
of significant market power (dominance), it is unlikely that a firm without a significant share
of the relevant market would be in a dominant position. Thus, the guidelines stress that firms
with market shares of no more than 25% are not likely to enjoy a (single) dominant position
on the market concerned.  In the Commission's decision making practice, single dominance
concerns normally arise in the case of firms with market shares of over 40%, although the
Commission may, in some cases, have concerns about dominance even with lower market
shares13. Concerning  the methods used for measuring market size and market shares, the
Commission’s guidelines state that both volume sales and value sales provide useful
information for market measurement14. These data are however usually unavailable for the
upstream Internet connectivity market.
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 This is the definition that the Court of Justice case-law ascribes to the concept of dominant position in Article
82 of the Treaty of Rome.
13
 According to established case-law, very large market shares — in excess of 50 % — are in themselves
evidence of the existence of a dominant position.
14
 In particular, in the case of bulk products, preference is given to volume, whereas in the case of differentiated
products (i.e. branded products), sales in value and their associated market share will often be considered to
reflect better the relative position and strength of each provider.
12
4.   Exploring of the backbone through Cyber-geography: Early Studies
The analysis of the Internet Upstream Routing, understanding its boundaries, traffic flows,
prices, market shares and revenues is particularly challenging both for the lack of satisfactory
statistical data and for the elusiveness, due to the non-dedicated connection modes of the
Internet Protocols, of the traffic exchanged among operators.
The public nature of the Internet and the routing protocols on which it is based often
allow, however, the analysis of the paths followed by information packets from origin to
destination through the Internet. An entire branch of research, Cybergeography,  is devoted to
the mapping of this physical-virtual world. The Cooperative Association for Internet Data
Analysis, (CAIDA) constructed a global Internet topology focussing on measuring the
performance of specific paths through the Internet. Claffy et al. (1999), using samples
covering 20,588 end destinations, determined the frequency with which an individual
backbone provider (identified by an Autonomous system number, AS)  appeared in a path
and the relative depth of those appearances, both in terms of number of backbones and the
number of hops crossed from the source. In their findings, CerfNet/AT&T, Cable & Wireless
(which purchased Internet MCI's backbone in 1998), Sprint, and UUNET played a major role
in transporting packets across the Internet.  Cossa (2000) considered a dataset  from
Boardwatch magazine Internet Service Providers Directory, 1999’s edition, showing the
breakdown of 8,950 backbone connections from 5,078 Internet service providers per major
backbone. With these data she evaluated  the impact of the MCI WorlCom- Sprint merger in
terms of market concentration. Cossa   also calculated  the HHI based on the number of
upstream  backbone connections and showed that the pre-merger HHI increased from 1450
up to 2090 as a result of a merger between the two companies.  In the next sections we
describe more recent algorithms and concepts as we will use them to construct Market
concentration indicators for the European Internet Upstream Routing Market.
5.   Recent studies on how to infer the Economic Relationship between two ISPs
A growing body of literature in the networking community works on defining the economic
position of an ISP, by evaluating the type of relationships it has with other ISPs. Since the
business part of this relationship is decided at a bilateral level and kept private, one has to
infer the type of relationship from the network connectivity structure resulting  from the
13
available data on inter ISP interconnection or Upstream routing. In this section we briefly
describe datasets and algorithms used to explore this inter-ISPs connectivity structures, which
we will then utilize to assess market concentration.
Actual Internet Routing
The main part of the actual Internet traffic exchanges (routing) happens at IP routers. These
have a table, whose role is to match an IP address contained in the header of a data packet to
the link leaving the router in the right direction. Through these tables each Autonomous
System – or AS- (ASes are Internet operators consisting in either a single network or a group
of networks that is controlled by a common network administrator)  announces, via the
Border Gateway Protocol (BGP), to a neighboring AS a list of paths made of more AS-nodes
leading to a final destination AS. The implementation of the routing policy determines which
BGP information in an ISP is generated, passed on and to whom of the connected neighbors:
which path is being presented.
The interplay of all the ASes individual routing policies results in the global
connectivity map for data transmissions across the Internet. This paper is motivated by the
belief that no reliable empirical alternative exists to this microrouting analysis for the study
of the upstream Internet market structure, and for its antitrust analysis.
Business Relationships
There are three15 basic types of business relationships that shape ISPs Upstream routing
policies: Customer-Provider, Provider-Customer and Peer-Peer. It is widely assumed in the
current literature that these three types of business relationships sufficiently capture various
contracts and agreements arising in the Internet. Although this is an oversimplification, the
basic business relationships provide a relatively close approximation in practice. These basic
types of business relationships are explained as follows:
Customer-Provider/Provider-Customer: in this relations both parties assume asymmetric
roles; the provider sells  the reachability of IP addresses,  the ability to transit all traffic to any
destination, while the customer pays for this connectivity.
Peer-Peer: usually, both parties exchange the traffic for their customers only – routes to their
providers and other peers are not revealed to each other. This is because peer-peer
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 The Computer Science Literature also considers a fourth type of relation, among Siblings, where both AS
belong to the same ISP. The ISP partitions his network to ease the technical management by hiding internal
information for each of the separate AS.
14
connectivity is usually not paid, and there is no incentive to share one’s other paid
connectivity.
Type of Relationship Inference from BGP Graphs
In this paper we suggest that the most useful way to learn about the economic type of
relationship between two ASes is by examining BGP dataset. Some ASes publish their BGP
path tables, and from this collection of paths it is possible to derive a network graph of the
Internet that describes the connectivity at the AS level.  In the analysis of the BGP path
tables, one central assumption, first formulated by Gao (L. Gao, 2001), is made to infer
relationship types. This assumption states that all paths are free of relationship-valleys.
Intuitively speaking, one can imagine a particular path to describe the trail of ISPs that an IP
data packet has to traverse to reach its destination network. This path of ASes will start at an
ISP who is a customer of the next “upstream” provider of IP connectivity, who in turn is a
customer of the next provider. Following this chain of customers, at some point we will reach
the peak in the hierarchy of AS that participate in this path, and from there on we expect the
IP data packet to descend a chain of provider to customer relations between ISPs till it
reaches the ultimate destination. The important observation in this description is that in any
path there is only one consecutive chain of upstream and one consecutive chain of
downstream ISPs present. Figuratively speaking, we assume that there are no valleys in these
hills of upstream/downstream chains. The following figure shows a set of valid paths and an
invalid valley.
Figure 1: Examples of valid paths
The intuition behind this assumption is that such a valley would imply that a customer is
transferring traffic from one of his providers to another provider and pays the first one for
receiving the traffic and the second to have it forwarded to the destination. Since doing so
would be economically irrational, we can assume that occurrences of such routing policy
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patterns are mis-configurations and any ISP has great incentive to rectify this situation
quickly.
The next assumption about AS path constraints states that peering is not transitive.
Hence for each AS path, there is only one peering link possible, and this can only be at the
peak of the path, exactly between the upstream and the downstream AS chains. This
constraint follows from the idea that the only traffic an ISP would accept from a peer is the
traffic from that peer and the one of his customers. If an ISP were to accept traffic from the
providers of a peer, then the ISP would actually perform a transit function for the providers of
the peer. Since nobody pays the ISP for this transit traffic, we can expect the ISPs to refuse
such traffic by filtering out routes that a peer might advertise with destinations that are not
contained in his AS, or his set of customers (not only the immediate customers, but all the
further customers down the line as well).
Internet Service Providers Classification
Historically, it was common  to classify ISPs into a strict hierarchy of Tiers, whereby the
ISPs within one tier were considered equally relevant in terms of network transport capacity
and economic bargaining power. In the following sections we will use a ASes  classification
derived from the ranking obtained from CAIDA’s AS-relationship inference/ranking
algorithm. Using the inferred relationships, a ranking is derived based on the dimension of
the set of customers of each AS. Since the relationship inference algorithm relies on valley-
free path relationships, we can assume that in the direction of a customer, down to the end of
an AS path, all ASes are themselves customers of the previous AS. This leads to a tree, or
“customer cone”, as it is referred to by Dimitropoulos et. al(2005) containing the set of
customers, including all the customers of these. The ASes 16 are  then ranked, based on the
dimension of this customer cone.
                                               
16
 For technical reasons, large ISPs operate using multiple ASes (e.g. UUNET uses 13), and it would be a
misrepresentation to rank each of these ASes separately, since they belong to the same company. The CAIDA
ranking aggregates ASes with company names that are similar in the ARIN database (two names are considered
similar, if they are identical, except for the last several characters). We rely on this grouping to consider
rankings of ISPs, instead of rankings of ASes only, since it improves the representation of the ranking, despite
some shortcomings.
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6.   Vertical Boundaries and  Market Concentration within the Euro-IX Members
Data description
IXPs17 are independent organizations composed by Internet Service Providers, where they
can route their Upstream traffic in a cost effective and technically efficient way.
The data used for the empirical analysis were collected in subsequent steps. Firstly we
obtained the lists of ISPs members for each Internet Exchange Point participating at the Trade
Association  Euro-IX18 . Then, for each IXP, and for each IXP’s member, we obtained two
sets of measures useful to assess its position within the Internet: the first metrics, provided by
CAIDA, associates a rank to each AS by looking at their location in the Internet hierarchy.
The rank is derived from the AS customer cone, defined as the AS itself plus its customers,
plus its customers’ customers, and so on19. We then used the algorithm devised by Huber et al
(2004) to infer the relationships between pair of ASes (provider to customer, customer to
provider, peering, sibling, no relationship) within each IXPs.
The second metrics is derived from the BGP tables displayed by Oregon Routeviews
Project20. Following Shimbel (1953) we calculated a  measure of betweenness (centrality) for
each AS v (see Brandes, 2001 for a survey on the algorithms used to compute betweenness).
In particular, the betweenness for AS v is given by the number of BGP paths - between any
pair of ASes – that traverse v. Formally,
( ) ( )∑
∈≠≠
=
Vtvs
sts vvB σ (1)
where ( ) ( )vv tsst σσ =  is the number of shortest paths from the AS s to the AS t on which the
AS v lies on. High betweenness indicates both that an AS node can reach other ASes on
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 IXPs play an absolutely crucial role in the Internet traffic Routing. As an example it is sufficient to think that
more than 90% of the Internet UK traffic is routed through the LINX-IX in London.
18
 AIX, AMS-IX, BCIX, BIX, BNIX, CATNIX, CIXP, DE-CIX, Equinix * +, ESPANIX, FICIX, GIGAPIX,
GN-IX, INEX, JPNAP * +, LINX, LIPEX, LIX, LoNAP, MaNAP, MIX, MSK-IX, NaMeX, NDIX, Netnod *,
NIX, NIX.CZ, NOTA +, PARIX, RoNIX, SIX, TIX, TOPIX, VIX, XchangePoint *, where* indicates IXPs with
multiple unconnected locations and + indicates IXPs located outside of Europe.
19
 The customer cone can be defined using three different precision levels: the AS cone, the AS prefix customer
cone, the AS /24 prefix customer cone. The AS cone indicates the size of the customer cone in terms of number
of ASes; this is a rough measure, since individual AS sizes can be very different. Since each AS advertises a
different number of prefixes, and the smallest bit of a prefix is the /24, the others two measures provide greater
accuracy in assessing the size of the customer cone. For full details see the CAIDA relevant web page at
(http://www.caida.org/analysis/topology/rank_as/index.xml).
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relatively short paths, and that this  AS has a certain degree of market power over the others,
since it may be costly to avoid the central ASes and follow other paths in order to deliver
packets over the Internet. This parameter clearly captures and measures the economic concept
of partial essential facility for central ASes.  We calculated the  betweenness, for every AS,
with respect to  the population of other ASes  of the IXP it is a member of. This means that
the betweenness we calculate is defined only by looking at the paths involving ISPs members
for each IXP; hence, it provides additional useful information on the partial bottlenecks,
centrality of given members within an IXP and not within the Internet as a whole.
Market Power and Market Concentration
The most widely used  measure of market power enjoyed by a certain firm i operating in the
market M is provided by the Lerner index 
ε
i
i
m
L = , where im  is the market share of firm i
and ε  is the market elasticity of demand. The index of overall market power is then given by
∑∑ ===
i
i
i
ii
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LmL
εε
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where ∑=
i
imHHI
2
 is the Herfindahl-Hirschman Index of concentration.
From (2) it is clear that  the HHI, and hence the pattern of market shares will  provide useful
insights to assess the degree of market power.  Our unit of analysis is again the Internet
Exchange Point, where a large share of Upstream Internet Routing is exchanged.
We devised two different proxies21 for the market share im :
• The first measure is directly obtained from the customer cone metrics: the market
share for each AS is obtained as the ratio of its customer cone  and the sum of all the
customer cones of the IXP members.
• The second  measure is derived from the betweenness of an AS. In particular, the
proxy for firm i’s market share  is obtained comparing its  relative betweenness, or
degree of unavoidability, within the IXP: this is computed by dividing the
betweenness value for the AS i by the sum of the betweenness values for all the ASes
considered. Formally,
                                                                                                                                                 
20
 For the full details, see the University of Oregon routeviews  project webpage at http://www.routeviews.org/
21
 Ideally, market shares within the IXP are derived by looking at the traffic flows. Since these data are
confidential we use the metrics introduced in the previous sections.
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where ( )vBs  is defined in (1).
This last measure focuses on the presence of essential facilities, often the root cause of the
presence of market power. In particular, the Internet is ambivalent about the presence of
essential facilities: its nature, the protocols which define the routing procedures, are indeed
meant to avoid predefined paths, making therefore easier to avoid essential facilities or
bottlenecks. However how successful traffic routing is in avoiding bottlenecks depends
essentially on the design of the interconnections among ISPs, and on its hierarchical
structure. Usually understanding the presence of an essential facility requires an  assessment
of how easy it is to duplicate a given input. In the specific context of the Internet, this means
an assessment of how easy is it to bypass a given route, or a node, managed by an AS that
refuses peering and requires a transit charge, a paid input.  The betweenness parameter
expressly captures the presence of partially essential facilities  in  Internet outing  by
focussing on how, avoidable or non avoidable, certain nodes are.
A first question that needs to be addressed is the following: are these proxies a
reasonable approximation of the effective market share within the IXP? In order to address
this question, we obtained confidential traffic data at LINX for the period October 2004-
November 2004. We then calculated the market share for each LINX member using both
inbound traffic and outbound traffic; hence we computed the HHI index, finding a very
strong correspondence with the HHI index calculated using the CAIDA customer cone
metrics22.
There is no immediate sensible comparison between the market share calculated by
the CAIDA rank and the one calculated using the betweenness data. Indeed, while the first is
targeted to capture the market share in terms of the established market position and, more
explicitly, the pattern of traffic flows, the second is meant to capture the relevance within the
IXP from an essential facility point of view. Table 1, below, shows the calculations for the
                                               
22: 0.021 is the effective HHI, while the indexes calculated with CAIDA customer cone, and betweenness are
0.024, and 0.05 respectively. Moreover, the market share squares calculated with the CAIDA customer cone
showed the highest correlation (0.74) with the squares of effectives market shares, (the correlation is instead
0.33 for the betweenness based proxies). This is a positive result indicating that it is sensible to calculate the
HHI index by using the CAIDA rank-based proxy market shares, and also that these proxies are probably a good
approximation of the effective market shares.
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two  concentration measures for all IXPs under analysis. We ranked the different IXPs
according to their CAIDA customer cone metrics-related HHI.
Table 1: IXPs  Concentration Indexes
ixp Location size hhi (c_c) hhi (betweenness)
ams-ix Amsterdam (NL) 221 0.025 0.051
linx London (UK) 179 0.024 0.046
dec-ix Frankfurt (GER) 145 0.033 0.067
equinix 7 locations (US) 187 0.023 0.048
nota Miami (US) 96 0.041 0.069
netnod Stockholm (SWE) 46 0.102 0.118
parix Paris (FR) 39 0.056 0.097
bnix Brussels (BE) 47 0.092 0.210
vix Vienna (AUS) 82 0.071 0.100
xchangepoint London (UK) 128 0.059 0.094
namex Rome (IT) 19 0.489 0.236
lipex London (UK) 53 0.986 0.069
tix Zurich (CH) 51 0.083 0.114
mix Milan (IT) 57 0.083 0.190
bcix Berlin (GER) 26 0.493 0.424
nix Oslo (NORWAY) 59 0.121 0.143
ndix Enschede (NL) 11 0.997 0.620
in-ex Dublin (IRL) 18 0.482 0.757
gn-ix Groningen (NL) 28 0.239 0.166
gigapix Lisbon (PORT) 21 0.501 0.448
cixp Geneva (CH) 24 0.143 0.188
msk-ix Moskow (RUSS) 156 0.179 0.259
six Ljubljana (SLOVE) 11 0.193 0.232
espanix Madrid (SPA) 28 0.125 0.172
aix Athens (GRE) 15 0.996 0.170
nix.cz Prague (CZ) 55 0.125 0.159
manap Manchester (UK) 29 0.248 0.123
catnix Barcelona (SPA) 20 0.494 0.259
ronix Bucharest (ROM) 21 0.219 0.266
lonap London (UK) 43 0.971 0.128
ficix Helsinki (FIN) 21 0.237 0.243
topix Turin (IT) 20 0.943 0.328
jpnap Tokyo (JAP) 48 0.110 0.187
bix Budapest (HUNG) 54 0.243 0.127
lix Luxembourg (LUX) 12 0.204 0.353
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According to HHI index using the CAIDA rank-based proxy market shares the fifteen least
concentrated IXPs are AMS-IX,  LINX, DE-CIX, EQUINIX, NOTA, NETNOD, PARIX,
BNIX, VIX, EXCHANGEPOINT, NAMEX, LIPEX, TIX, MIX AND BCIX. This order, as
we can see from table 2, is not reflected when the HHI concentration index is calculated
according to the betweenness.
Table 2: Cross ranking top 15
15  least
concentrated HHI cc
15  least
concentrated HHI
betweenness
1. ams-ix 1. linx
2. linx 2. equinix
3. dec-ix 3. ams-ix
4. equinix 4. dec-ix
5. nota 5. nota
6. netnod 6. lipex
7. parix 7. exchangepoint
8. bnix 8. parix
9. vix 9. vix
10. exchangepoint 10. tix
11. namex 11. netnod
12. lipex 12. manap
13. tix 13. bix
14. mix 14. lonap
15. bcix 15. nix
These ranking asymmetries are important in showing the different aspects of concentration
captured by the two complementary proposed indexes. This is natural for the antitrust
analysis of complex network industries where concentration can only be captured along
different dimensions, in this case customer base, and network centrality.
In this first step of the analysis we considered the entire memberships of the IXP as if
they were part of the same market and calculated the newly proposed concentration indexes
accordingly. This is clearly not the case given the difference in ranking amongst the ASes
member s of any given IXP. In the next section we address this  problem by introducing  the
vertical market boundaries within these memberships.
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Vertical Boundaries
In this section we use the  CAIDA rank measure, introduced before, to derive the ASes’
distribution over a set of vertically separated classes, by looking at  jumps in their customer
cones values. In particular, we group all ASes into four major groups according to their
CAIDA ranking reported below:
a) “Tier 1”(Rank 1-12): this set contains the ISPs that are located at the top of the
Internet hierarchy. Most of the providers in this class are the so called Internet
backbones of Tier 1. Tier 1 providers distinguish themselves from any other ISP, by
not paying for transit traffic to any other ISP. They only have peers and customers. To
achieve global path reachability they peer with other ISPs in this class23.
b) Core composed by those ASes ranking between 13 and 250. This group can be
subdivided into two sub groups:
i) “Inner core”(Rank 13 – 49): most of the ISPs included in this class need to
buy transit from one or more tier 1 ISPs to reach all paths, but only from those,
and are able to contain a large proportion of their traffic within their own and
their customers’ networks. This set contains many important ISPs, such as
Korea Telecom, France Telecom, Tiscali. It also contains the largest
university, California State University (a network of dozens of campuses); and
ii)  “Outer Core”(Rank 50 – 250): this set contains many large players, who are
not transit providers, such as HP, Microsoft, Apple, but also significant ISPs
such as Peer 1 Network Inc., Hutchison Global Communications, CHINA
UNICOM, Bell South.net, as well as large academic networks such as the ones
of the UK, Germany and China. A few universities with the largest address
space allocations also fall into this class, such as Harvard and MIT24.
c) Transit composed by those ranking between 251and 4000; this group can be divided
into three sub groups:
                                               
23
 1 This class actually contains about 18 known ISPs, but in the CAIDA ranking, several of these ISPs are
ranked significantly below number 12 (e.g. British Telecom = rank 36 and AOL Transit Data Network = rank
48).
24
 The #/24-number in the customer cone drops by over one order of a magnitude within this class.
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i) Regional Transit(Rank 251 – 1000): this set contains many regionally relevant
ISPs, such as Road Runner (US), Telecom Argentina S.A, Nextra Austria,
Asia Online New Zealand, States of Michigan, Georgia, Arkansas, Minnesota,
etc. Some larger universities can also be found here, such as The University of
Texas at Austin, Stanford, and the University of British Columbia25.
ii) Local Transit (Rank 1001 – 2500):  the ISPs listed in this set contains many
locally relevant transit players, e.g. Boston Data Centers Inc., OmanTel,
Tiscali Belgium, Portland - Metro Area Network (P-MAN), ARBINET-
THEXCHANGE, INC., Danish network for Research and Education, many
universities, such as Yale, Emory, University of Virginia, and the University
of New Mexico. The #/24-number in the customer cone drops by 72% within
this class.
iii) Campus Level(Rank 2501 – 4000): this class contains many corporate campus
level network (e.g. Cray Inc., Wachovia Operational Services Corporation,
Morgan Stanley Dean Witter, BASF Corporation, Oracle Corporation
Datacenter, Wal-Mart Stores, Inc.) as well as many university campus (e.g.
Mount Sinai School of Medicine, Bradley University, Brigham Young
University, Bates College, Georgia State University, University of Salzburg),
networks and a few smaller ISPs with local reach (e.g. China Information
Broadcast Network Ltd.Co., China Enterprise Communications Ltd., ADC
Telecommunications Inc., Skyrr ISP Network)26. And finally we have the
d)  ISP customers (Rank below 4000). Most of these ISPs do not have any further
customers, are leafs in the hierarchy. Some of these ISPs, do have customers, up to
one dozen, but are more likely to have between 1-5 customers, if they have any. The
networks grouped in this list are many small customer ISPs (e.g. BusinessOnline AG -
German ISP, Wave2Wave Communications, Inc., FreiNet GmbH, Pacific Information
Exchange, Inc., Kabel Deutschland Breitband Service GmbH, Belize
Telecommunications Limited, Startec Global Communications, TSI
Telecommunication Services, Northeast Telecom Inc.), a few companies (e.g.
DuPont, First Citizens Bank, Hotels.com, Deloitte Consulting) and some universities,
                                               
25
 The #/24-number in the customer cone drops by over one order of a magnitude within this class.
26
 The #/24-number in the customer cone drops by a further 63% within this class
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schools and public institutions (e.g. University of the Aegean, Innsbrucker
Kommunalbetriebe AG, National Dong Hwa University, The Open University of
Hong Kong, University of Tehran).
In the following figures we are able to show the vertical hierarchical composition for all IXPs
members of the Euro-IX, by classifying their ISPs members into one of the four categories
introduced above.
Figure 2.a: IXPs class composition
Figure 2.b: IXPs class composition
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Figure 2.c: IXPs class composition
Figure 2.d: IXPs class composition
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From the Figures 2a, to 2d,  above we notice that less than 50% of the IXPs (16 out of 35 of
the Euro-IX ) have ISPs members belonging to the Tier1 class. This outcome is relevant since
it shows that the largest percentage of IXPs is not independently able to forward packets to
the entire Internet, i.e. it does not allow direct universal connectivity.
It is also interesting to point out that the IXPs with a small number of members are
consistently characterized by a higher percent of ASes belonging from the lowest hierarchies
in the Internet (ISP customers).  Given the hierarchical structure that governs the Internet, it
is presumably sensible to assume that a balanced IXP is characterized by a distribution of
ASes over the four classes following a pyramidal structure: the Tier 1 providers should
represent the smallest percentage, then a greater share of the members should be constituted
by the Core providers, and then the largest share by Transit and ISPs customers providers.
Such a balanced structure, however, seems to be a feature of a small set of IXPs. Among the
largest IXPs, it seems fairly satisfied, with the only exception of MSK-IX and EXCHANGE
POINT. On the other hand, small IXPs seem characterised by consistently different
distributions, with few exceptions (BNIX, ESPANIX, CIXP, FICIX, NETNOD).
The bulk of IXPs is low-hierarchy biased, with more than 90% of members belonging to
classes of Transit and ISP customers. The opposite situation characterizes only a few IXPs,
where the percentage of providers in the first classes is greater than 20% (NOTA, PARIX,
CIXP, EQUINIX, ESPANIX).
7.   Market Concentration, by vertical and geographical classification.
Having introduced the vertical market classification algorithm we finally need to consider the
problem of drawing the geographic market boundaries before being able to perform our
empirical analysis of the Upstream Internet Routing European market. Should we demarcate
markets following the national boundaries or is this concept not appropriate for the Internet
upstream connections?
In this section we suggest that the most appropriate criterion for geographic
demarcation is to identify the IXPs that are independently able  to supply universal
connectivity, i.e.  IXPs having, among their members, ISPs falling into the  Tier 1 class.
Figure 3 below maps the full geographical distribution of the ISP typologies across IXPs in
Europe. The first clear element from this map is that not  all locations have Tier 1 class
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providers,  being  therefore unable to provide independently Universal connectivity, at least
within their IXPs memberships.
Figure 3:  ISP distribution per typology and IXP location.
As a result locations related to an IXP unable to provide universal connectivity should not be
considered as independent markets.
In the following we focus our attention to a restricted set of geographically
independent locations where IXPs have, indeed,  the possibility to operate as centres for
universal connectivity,   without having to connect with another Exchange Point. We
consider four of the major IXPs: namely the LINX, DECIX, MIX and AMSIX.  Each one of
them, having Tier 1 class members, is considered as an independent geographic market
allowing direct universal connectivity to its members. For each one of these IXPs we
calculate the two specific HHI market concentration indexes discussed in the previous
sections, the customer cones and the betweenness one. Moreover, these indexes are also
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decomposed according to five27 vertical-hierarchical classes: Tier1 (rank 1-12), Inner Core
(rank 13-49), Outer Core (rank 50-250), Transit (rank 251-4000), and ISP customers (rank
4001-).  As a result we obtain location & layer specific concentration indexes or, in other
words, concentration indexes for the relevant market. The results we obtain, shown in the
Tables 3, 4, 5 and 6 below are significantly different from the aggregate ones and we believe
they provide a step forward towards the application of the Commission’s guidelines in
assessing location & class specific market concentration for the Internet Upstream Routing at
European IXPs.
Table 3 below shows the calculations for the LINX IXP.
Table 3: LINX location-class specific Concentration Indexes
Class #members hhi_c_c hhi_b
Tier1 (1-12) 8 1253.19 1981.51
Inner Core (13-49) 20 416.67 616.89
Outer Core (50-250) 26 1037.07 1711.95
Transit (251-4000) 63 324.95 452.2
ISPcustomers (4001-) 34 303.25 471.27
LINX Matrix 151 (actual28) 241.18 460.797
The first column of Table 3 above, shows the number of IXP’s members belonging to each
single class, while the second and third columns, provide the two different HHI indexes, the
first calculated on the customer cone “market shares” and the second on the betweenness
ratios. According to the Merger Guidelines, [U.S. Department of Justice (1997)], some of the
market concentration values estimated in Table 3 would immediately fall within the special
attention category, in particular we can see that both the first, Tier1, and third, Outer Core
(50-250), classes at the LINX, display an HHI concentration index higher than 1000, while
class two, Inner Core (13-49), four, Transit (251-4000) and five ISP customers (4001-)
appear  more competitive.
Moving to AMSIX in the Netherlands, Table 4, below shows that again the first class
is the most concentrated, however class three is very concentrated in terms of betweenness.
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 For this application we have subdivided the original Core class introduced above into two classes: Inner Core
(composed by ASes ranking between 13 and 49) and Outer Core (composed by ASes  ranking between 50 and
250), leaving the other classes unchanged.
28
 ASes with insufficient information in terms of rank or interconnection agreements were deleted.
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The difference between HHI based on customer cones and betweenness needs further scrutiny
in future research.  Surely the betweenness expresses the presence of partly essential
facilities, and concentration in it could express the pivotal role of some ISPs that, while not
having a particularly large customer base, still represents an almost non-avoidable essential
facility in the Upstream Internet Routing.
Table 4: AMS-IX location-class specific Concentration Indexes
Class #members hhi_c_c hhi_b
Tier1 (1-12) 7 1432.62877 2244.74908
Inner Core (13-49) 21 526.31613 746.90882
Outer Core (50-250) 25 840.45206 1916.51481
Transit (251-4000) 77 302.661 298.13832
ISPcustomers (4001-) 44 285.12583 370.29314
AMS-IX Matrix 174 (actual) 251.46 512
Table 5 below explores concentration at the DECIX.
Table 5: DECIX location-class specific Concentration Indexes
Class #members hhi_c_c hhi_b
Tier1 (1-12) 8 1253.18843 1866.04104
Inner Core (13-49) 13 769.23147 1124.47828
Outer Core (50-250) 20 1078.14838 2688.13068
Transit (251-4000) 80 353.57891 298.05377
ISPcustomers (4001-) 21 753.55818 1130.98521
DECIX Matrix 142(actual) 331.97 665.02
This Exchange Point shows higher concentration clearly in class one and three according to
the customer cone HHI, but also in class one, two, three and five according to the
betweenness HHI. Finally, table 6 below describes  market concentration at the MIX in
Milan. In this IXP we have almost always a very concentrated market structure. Maybe this
result is due to the smaller membership characterising each class.
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Table 6: MIX  location-class specific Concentration Indexes
Class #members hhi_c_c hhi_b
Tier1 (1-12) 3 3333.33 6011.1584
Inner Core (13-49) 5 20000 3370.93
Outer Core (50-250) 6 2479.1 7898
Transit (251-4000) 26 1370.3 1119.5
ISPcustomers (4001-) 17 817.8 1137.1
MIX Matrix 57 (actual) 833.2 1896.7
8.   Conclusions
Concerns about the presence and the effects of market power involving the Internet upstream
access are increasing with the fast development of the Internet demand. Antitrust authorities,
involved in the analysis of proposed mergers, however lack reliable data, since both traffic
flows and interconnection clauses are sealed under confidentiality agreements.  In this paper
we suggested a possible solution to this problem, centred on the use of innovative metrics to
assess concentration in the upstream Internet market. In particular, our approach is based on
the retrieval of implicit interconnection policies, the discrimination blueprints expressing the
real bargaining power of each ISP, from publicly available Border Getaway Protocol (BGP)
data. Indeed, given the confidentiality of explicit peering and interconnection pricing policies
for this market, we believe that the only possible way to learn about the economic type of
relationship between two undertakings is by examining data contained in the BGP tables.
We focussed on the European upstream Internet market. In order to assess
concentration we considered four leading European Internet Exchange Points (IXPs): the
London Internet Exchange Point (LINX), The Deutsche Commercial Internet Exchange Point
(DECIX), the Amsterdam Internet Exchange Point (AMSIX) and the Milan Internet
Exchange Point (MIX).
We followed a two step process: firstly we introduced a price-independent algorithm for
defining both the vertical and geographical relevant market boundaries, then we calculated
market concentration indexes using two novel metrics. These assess, for each undertaking,
both its role as an essential network facility, thorough the measurement of its relative
betweenness,  and its wholesale market share, via the ranking of its  customer cone.
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The results show that some vertical segments of these markets are highly concentrated
and would hence fall within the special attention category according to the Merger Guidelines
[U.S. Department of Justice (1997)]. The measures of market concentration obtained using
our two different metrics tend to move closely together, although with different concentration
indexes. This result reinforces the rationale to look at both these dimensions of market
concentration. This is expected in the framework of network industries, where a relevant
notion of market concentration needs to be captured along more than one single dimension.
In our case the two dimensions considered are wholesale customer base, and network
centrality.
Finally, market power can be a transient phenomenon, and market concentration may
change rapidly in highly innovative sectors, such as the Internet. This clearly implies that the
tasks of identifying the relevant market and to assess its concentration need to be re-evaluated
regularly. Our proposed indicators can be of particular use for repeated antitrust analysis
since they are not based on ad hoc information gathering but on existing algorithms applied
to regularly updated databases. As a result we think that no reliable empirical alternative
exists to the analysis of the micro-routing decisions, based on the retrieval of BGP policies,
for the study of the upstream Internet, routing, market structure, and for its antitrust analysis.
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